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SEXUAL MINORITY RIGHTS IN THE
WORKPLACE
Arthur S. Leonard*
This presentation at the Carl A. Warns, Jr. Labor and Employment Law
Institute was officially publicized as being about Gay Rights in the
Workplace, but the more expansive approach of sexual minorities in the
workplace is more appropriate, because the developments involving lesbians,
gay men, bisexuals, and transgendered people are interrelated. Confining the
discussion narrowly to gay rights would give an incomplete picture.
Spectacular changes have occurred concerning transsexual rights, including
an important decision by the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals in the week prior to
this program.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION AND THE PUBLIC SECTOR
Until the late 1960s, when the federal courts began developing a theory of
constitutional protection for public employees, one could not even begin to talk
about workplace rights for sexual minorities. All of the law went the other way.
In the federal sector an executive order issued by President Dwight Eisenhower
in the early 1950s mandated the termination of any federal employee found to
be gay; security clearances for work in defense industries or any government
agencies requiring such clearances were routinely denied to gay people; and
when the issue came up, professional licensing agencies at the state level
generally found that gay people lacked the good moral character necessary to
provide professional services to the public. 2 Openly gay or transgendered
* Professor, New York Law School. Based on a presentation prepared for delivery on June
11, 2004, Louisville, Kentucky, at the annual Warns Labor & Employment Institute. A faculty
research grant from New York Law School supported work on this paper. Research assistance
by Joshua Feldman is gratefully acknowledged.
I Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that transsexuals can bring
employment discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging
discrimination on the basis of gender and sex-stereotyping).
2 Exec. Order No. 10450, 18 Fed. Reg. 2489 (April 27, 1953); State ex rel. Florida Bar v.
Kimball, 96 So.2d 825 (Fla. 1957).
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people could not be public school teachers, and had virtually no legal recourse
for adverse employment decisions.
This began to change most decisively in 1969, when a federal appeals court
in Washington, D.C. found that the new due process rights that had been
previously identified for public employees would cut against a federal agency's
ability to discharge an employee for off-duty homosexual conduct merely on the
basis that his sexuality was an embarrassment to the agency.3 While not all
federal courts agreed with this proposition, by the late 1970s things had
advanced to the point where President Jimmy Carter's Civil Service Reform
Act had incorporated the concept that civil servants could only be dismissed for
reasons that related to their job qualifications and the ability of their agency to
function, and it was generally understood beginning at that time that sexual
orientation, as such, would no longer be the basis for a discharge from the civil
service.4 However, this did not hold true for military, national security, or law
enforcement employment, and all attempts through litigation to change these
policies were then unsuccessful. 5 The process for granting security clearances
for employees of federal defense contractors had also been problematic for gay
people, and litigation attempting to mitigate this problem was unsuccessful
as well.6
At the federal level, a major extension of the protection against
discrimination for gay employees occurred during the Clinton administration in
the 1990s.7 The process for granting security clearances was revised through an
executive order,8 and individual agency executive orders issued during the early
years of the Clinton administration established non-discrimination policies in
all executive branch departments for civilian federal employees, including the
federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies. 9 Uniformed military
employees were governed by a political compromise negotiated between the
Clinton administration and the Congress in 1993, under which gay people can
3 Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
4 The Civil Service Re-Organization Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1192
(codified at 5 U.S.C.§ 7101 (2001)).
5 See, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, reh 'g
denied, 909 F.2d 375 (9th Cir. 1990); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
6 High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 570-580.
7 See infra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
8 Exec. Order No. 12968, 60 Fed. Reg. 40,245 (August 7, 1995).
9 Federal GLOBE, an organization of sexual minority federal employees, has collected the
various agency executive policy statements on sexual orientation discrimination and posted
them on its website, www.fedglobe.org (last visited 2/22/2005).
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serve in the military so long as they do not do anything to upset the pretense
that gay people are not serving. 10 The so-called "don't ask-don't tell" policy
makes the U.S. Defense Department a laughing-stock before our major military
allies, all of whom have over the past ten years or so abandoned prior
restrictions on military service by openly-gay personnel."
Perhaps most significantly, during his second term President Clinton issued
an executive order covering all non-military personnel of the Executive Branch,
consolidating the non-discrimination policy. 12  President Bush has not
rescinded this order, although there has been some question regarding the
efficacy of its enforcement in light of developments at the Office of Special
Counsel, whose director removed the mention of sexual orientation coverage
from the agency's website, arguing that there was no statutory basis for a
statement that federal employees were specifically protected from
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.'
3
Apart from any statutory or administrative policy statements, in light of the
Supreme Court's 1996 decision in Romer v. Evans14 and 2003 decision in
Lawrence v. Texas, 15 gay federal employees would have potential due process
and equal protection claims against any civilian federal agency that embraced
an explicit policy of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. In
Romer, the Supreme Court found that a state constitutional provision that
would bar the state and its political subdivisions from adopting any policy
against sexual orientation discrimination was a clear violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (and, by implication, of the
coequal doctrine that the Supreme Court has identified as binding on the federal
government under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause).16 Although the
Court did not discuss whether sexual orientation, as such, would be considered
a "suspect classification" for purposes of determining whether official policies
10 The Don't Ask, Don't Tell (Homosexual Conduct) Policy, Army Command Policy,
Army Reg. 600-20, TT 4-19 (May 13, 2002).
1 Id. The principal military ally of the U.S. at present in Iraq is the United Kingdom,
which not only allows gays to serve, but actively recruits gay people to serve. British Royal
Navy Will Recruit Gays, L A. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2005, available at 2005 WL 56331162.
12 Exec. Order No. 13087, 63 Fed. Reg. 30,097 (June 2, 1998).
13 Brad Sears and Alan Hirsch, Commentary: If Gays Are OK, Job Bias Can't Be, L.A.
TIMES, April 29, 2004, at B13, available at 2004 WL 55909542; T. Shawn Taylor, Federal
Office Confirms Laws Cover Lesbian Gay Workers, CHI. TRIBUNE, April 13, 2004, at 4,
available at 2004 WL 75721214.
14 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
15 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2004).
16 Romer, 517 U.S. at 631-636.
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that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation should be subjected to
heightened levels of judicial review, at least one member of the Court, Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor, has opined in her concurring opinion in Lawrence v.
Texas, that sexual orientation should call forth "more searching" inquiry into
the government's justifications for the policy.1 7 Lawrence, by overruling the
Court's 1986 Georgia sodomy law decision, Bowers v. Hardwick, 18 removed an
important part of the theoretical foundation for earlier federal court decisions
that had rejected discrimination claims by gay federal employees.19
These constitutional principles are also applicable to state and local
governments, by virtue of both the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause and by state constitutional equal protection principles, and are
supplemented in several states by executive orders or state statutes that
establish policies of non-discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and,
in a few cases, gender identity, in public employment.2 °
II. THE PRIVATE SECTOR
There is less protection against discrimination in the private sector. From
an early point, the ban on sex discrimination enacted by Congress in Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 196421 was construed by federal courts to provide no
protection against discrimination for sexual minorities.22 The lack of any
detailed legislative history for the floor amendment that added "sex" to Title
VII led courts to take a narrowly literal view of the meaning of the phrase
"because of sex," rejecting claims by people whose sexual orientation or gender
17 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 580.
18 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
19 The rhetorical move, pioneered by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in 1987
in Padula, was to find that a group whose common identity was defined by conduct that was not
constitutionally protected would not be accorded any sort of "special protection" under the
Equal Protection Clause. In Romer, the Court rejected the idea that protection from
discrimination was "special," and in Lawrence, the Court found a constitutional bar to
criminalizing the relevant conduct.
2 0 See, e.g., Quinn v. Nassau County, 53 F. Supp. 2d 347 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (County held
liable for sexual-orientation based discrimination against county police officer).
21 The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Tit. 7, §701, Stat. 253 (codified at42
U.S.C. 2000e (2001)).
22 See, e.g., EEOC Dec. 76-75, CCH Emp. Prac. Para 6495 (1976); Voyles v. Ralph K.
Davies Medical Center, 403 F. Supp. 456 (N.D.Cal. 1975); Smith v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
Co., 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1987).
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nonconformity had resulted in adverse personnel decisions against them.23 The
leading case was DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone.2 4 To illustrate the gravity of
change, in the recent Sixth Circuit decision referred to at the outset, DeSantis is
referred to as having been overruled in 2001 by the Ninth Circuit, in a case
involving workplace harassment of a man who was perceived by co-workers as
effeminate and possibly gay. 5
The big change in the private sector came first at the municipal, then the
state level, with the federal government very much on the sidelines. By the late
1970s, a handful of municipalities and counties had passed ordinances banning
sexual orientation discrimination in employment, and in the 1980s, some states
had joined them. Although the passage of some of these measures stimulated
voter initiatives that repealed some of them, the general trend was for more to
be enacted and by the 1990s, most of the voter repeal initiatives were being
defeated. By the early 1990s, so many cities had banned sexual orientation
discrimination that a substantial plurality of the American population was
working in jurisdictions where such discrimination was illegal.26
In 1993, in an article published in the Labor Law Journal, this writer
asserted based on a study of state and local laws and 1990 U.S. Census figures
that about 23 % of the U.S. population lived in jurisdictions where it was
unlawful for employers to discriminate based on sexual orientation.27 In the
intervening years, with the prominent additions of California, New York,
Illinois, and the extension of coverage through all but one New England state, it
is now likely that a majority of American workers are in jobs that are covered
by some statutory prohibition on sexual orientation discrimination in the private
28sector or some degree of constitutional protection in the public sector. In
Kentucky, Louisville passed such an ordinance in 1999, and several other local
jurisdictions in the state have legislated on the subject, including Lexington-
23 See infra notes 25-26.
24 Desantis v. Pacific Telephone, 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979).
25 Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc., 256 F. 3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001).
26 Arthur S. Leonard, Sexual Orientation and the Workplace: A Rapidly Developing Field,
44 LABOR L. J. 574 (September 1993).
27 Id.
28 A current list of jurisdictions that have enacted statutory bans on workplace
discrimination on account of sexual orientation (and, in some cases, gender identity) is
maintained by Human Rights Campaign, under the title "Equality in the States: Gay, Lesbian,
Bisexual and Transgendered Americans and State Laws and Legislation," and can be found on
its website, www.hrc.org (last visited 2/22/2005).
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Fayette Urban County, Jefferson County, and Covington. 29 A bill is pending in
the Kentucky legislature to add protection against discrimination based on
sexual orientation and gender identity, although it is not likely to pass
anytime soon.3 °
A new element in the movement for sexual minority workplace rights
emerged with the transgender rights movement. Transgendered persons are
individuals whose gender identity differs from their biological sex in such a
strong way that they seek to live as a member of the other sex. By the 1950s,
plastic surgery and hormone therapy had become sufficiently advanced to make
this increasingly possible, although expensive and difficult. Of course, there
are also historical reports from earlier times of women living as men in some
unusual cases. The number of people who experience this condition, called
"gender dysphoria" by medical experts, is very small, but significant enough
that many large cities now have active transgender rights organizations.
Initially rebuffed by the leaders of the gay rights movement from their
demand to add gender identity to the text of proposed civil rights laws at the
state and federal level, the transgender movement pursued a dual strategy: to
work for acceptance by the gay rights movement, which by the mid-1980s was
relatively well-organized politically and far larger in numbers, and to lobby
legislators directly for transgender rights. The first major payoff, after a few
successes at the municipal level, came in Minnesota, which adopted a broad
definition of sexual orientation in its 1993 civil rights law that clearly intended
to include gender identity as a forbidden basis for discrimination. 31 Over the
past ten years, the movement for transgender inclusion in sexual minority civil
rights protection has grown apace, adding more states and many
more municipalities.32
At the same time, the federal courts were beginning to see new meanings in
Title VII's ban on sex discrimination. The 1980s brought a critical mass of
appellate precedent for the proposition that sexual harassment in the workplace
was a form of sex discrimination if it was sufficiently severe and pervasive to
be said to have altered terms and conditions of employment of a particular
29 LouisvILLE, KY., § 98.01 (1999); LEXINGTON, KY., Ordinance No. 201-99 (1999); and
JEFFERSON CouNTY, Ky., § 92.01 (1999).
30 Kentucky Civil Rights Act, Ky. Rev. Stat. § 344.010, H.B. 14, 2003 Leg. Sess. (Ky.
2003).
31 MINN. STAT. Ann. § 363 A.03 (West 2004).
32 See supra note 28.
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worker or group of workers because of their sex.3 1 In another line of
development, the courts began to adopt a broader understanding of sex
discrimination as including discrimination against people whose expression of
their gender diverged from the expectations of their peers.34
The two main theoretical lines of sexual harassment law, quid pro quo, and
hostile environment, lent themselves to two distinctly different kinds of cases
where sexual minorities were concerned. There were cases where men
(usually) found themselves, either because they were or were perceived to be
gay or were perceived as sexually enticing, to be the recipients of unwanted
sexual attention from other men in the workplace. Sometimes this could
involve a gay supervisor trading on a position of authority to seek sexual favors,
but sometimes it might involve a non-gay supervisor making advances toward a
gay employee in an expression of control or hierarchy. Either way, these cases
could lend themselves to the same quid pro quo analysis that had characterized
the first successful sexual harassment cases brought by women, where
continued employment, favorable assignments, pay increases, or promotions
were conditioned on the employee submitting to a supervisor's sexual demands.
As early as 1981, federal courts were finding that employees who were the
targets of such attention from supervisors of the same sex could have a claim of
sex discrimination under Title VU.
35
The more controversial extension was the hostile environment theory,
which overlaps with quid pro quo but goes beyond it to more generalized
hostility that has a sexual flavor but does not necessarily involve a demand for
sexual favors. These cases have proved quite difficult for the courts, even in the
setting of women being harassed by men that first won judicial approval for the
application of Title VII. 36 But it turns out that one of the major workplace
issues for sexual minority employees, and especially gay men, has been hostile
33 The lead Supreme Court case was Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
34 The lead Supreme Court case was Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
35 Wright v. Methodist Youth Serv., 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Ill. 1981). Federal circuit
courts continue to accept to quid pro quo theory in same-sex harassment cases. See, e.g., Cooke
v. Stefani Mgmt. Serv., 250 F.3d. 564 (7th Cir. 2001).
36 E.g., compare, Clark County School District v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001);
Chamberlin v. 101 Realty, Inc., 915 F.2d 777 (1st Cir. 1990), with Little v. Windermere
Relocation, Inc., 301 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2002).
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environment harassment, ranging from name-calling and practical jokes all the
way to outright physical assaults.37
Ironically, the case that brought this most forcibly to the attention of the
legal profession and the public did not involve a gay man. Joseph Oncale's
sexual harassment claim, based on verbal and physical assaults directed against
him by male co-workers while employed on an oilrig in the Gulf of Mexico,
brought an historic Supreme Court ruling.38 In that case, the Court held that
Title VII should be interpreted according to its express language and structure
in such cases.39 That is, if an employee of either sex is singled out by co-
workers or supervisors for harassment because of his or her sex, and the
harassment is sufficiently severe and pervasive to have adversely changed their
terms and conditions of employment, then there could be a valid claim under
40Title VII, regardless whether the victim of the harassment is gay or not gay.
The lower federal courts have been neither unanimous nor consistent in
applying these principles to harassment cases brought by individuals who were
either gay or perceived to be so, and many cases seem to go off on the nature of
the initial pleadings and the kind of testimony given by the complainant during
pre-trial discovery.41 The courts having unanimously concluded that sexual
37 The paradigm case for hostile environment same-sex harassment is Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998), although the plaintiff was not actually gay, merely
perceived as such by others.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 79.
40Id.
41 The extraordinary diversity of views can be traced through numerous circuit court of
appeals decisions. See, e.g., Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252 (1st Cir.
1999) (gay employee in Maine who suffered workplace same-sex harassment was not protected
by civil rights laws); Schmedding v. Tnemec Co., 187 F. 3d 862 (8th Cir. 1999) (homophobic
harassment actionable as sex discrimination under Title VII); Shermer v. Illinois Dept. of
Transp., 171 F.3d 475 (7th Cir. 1999) (affirming summary judgment in favor of employer in
same-sex sexual harassment case post-Oncale); Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F. 3d 33 (2nd Cir.
2000) (anti-gay workplace harassment does not violate Title VII's ban on sex discrimination
unless plaintiff can show that harassment was due to his sex); Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231
F.3d 1080 (7th Cir., 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 995 (2001) (homophobic workplace
harassment not actionable under Title VII when it was apparently motivated by dislike of
plaintiff's sexual orientation, rather than discrimination on account of sex); Bibby v.
Philadelphia Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257 (3rd Cir. 2001) (gay man's hostile
environment sexual harassment claim failed under Title VII because he showed only that he was
victimized because of his sexual orientation, not because of his sex; plaintiff made no
allegations of gender nonconformity or other defining aspects of actionable same-sex
harassment as required by Oncale v. Sundowner); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
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orientation discrimination, as such, is not covered by Title VII, and they tend to
reject those harassment cases that are premised solely on anti-gay motives, and
to accept those that can plausibly be structured as more like what might be
called perceived gender identity cases--cases in which the harassers are
motivated by discomfort due to gender non-conformity of the victim of the
harassment. 42 A recent example from the Sixth Circuit is King v. Super
Service, Inc.,43 where the court held that the plaintiff s case was clearly one of
anti-gay harassment, thus a Title VII claim was properly dismissed. 44
The second major development under Title VII involves the expansion of
the meaning of "because of sex" to include issues of gender non-conformity,
through the theory of sex-stereotyping. This won Supreme Court endorsement
in 1989 in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.45  The Court ruled in Price
Waterhouse that if a woman was disadvantaged in the competition for
partnership by the opposition of partners who sought to impose their own
stereotyped views of properly gendered female behavior, the disadvantaged
woman had suffered a form of sex discrimination.4 6 Justice William J.
Brennan, Jr. wrote that Title VII was intended by Congress to eliminate the
barriers that kept women from equal participation and success in the workplace,
including stereotyped attitudes about women's place and appropriate feminine
conduct and behavior.47 For the first time, the Court referred to gender, not just
v. Harbert-Yeargin, Inc., 266 F.3d 498 (6th Cir. 2001) (reversing verdict for EEOC in same-sex
harassment case); Lack v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 240 F.3d 255 (4th Cir. 2001) (Same-sex
harassment jury verdict overturned on ground that supervisor's harassing comments were not
based upon male employee's sex); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Ent., Inc., 256 F. 3d 864, (9th Cir.
2001) (homophobic harassment inspired by the victim's perceived gender non-conformity is
actionable sex discrimination under Title VII; frequently name-calling and other verbal
harassment is sufficiently severe and pervasive to affect employment conditions adversely, and
employer's ineffective response subjects it to liability for harassment by plaintiffs co-workers);
Davis v. Coastal Int'l Sec., Inc., 275 F. 3d 1119 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (rejecting same-sex
harassment claim, absent evidence plaintiff was selected for harassment because of his sex); La
Day v. Catalyst Tech., Inc., 302 F.3d 474 (5th Cir. 2002) (reversing a dismissal of a same-sex
harassment claim brought by a male employee based upon sex by virtue of his male supervisor's
apparent homosexuality and whether supervisor subjected employee to a hostile work
environment); Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied,
538 U.S. 922 (2003) (ruling that a gay man may sue his employer for sexual harassment by
fellow male employees under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
42 See infra note 43.
43 King v. Super Service, Inc., 68 Fed. Appx. 659 (6th Cir. 2003) (a 2003 decision, not
officially published but available from Westlaw and Lexis).
44 See id.
45 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
46 Id. at 239.
47 Id. at 251.
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as sex, but as a part of the concern of Title VII. 48 "Gender" implicates how
society constructs the roles to be played by the different anatomical sexes, and
it is changeable over time. Recall the long, powdered wigs worn by traditional
English barristers and judges to get a whiff of the variation in socially
constructed gender roles for professional men in different places and times.
By the mid-1990s, courts were beginning to entertain arguments, primarily
from male plaintiffs who had been subjected to hostile environment harassment
mainly by male co-workers, that harassment inspired by the plaintiff s gender
non-conformity, either in dress, gesture, or grooming, is a form of sex
discrimination in line with the Price Waterhouse precedent.49 Again, not every
federal judge was willing to accept this argument, and some, most notably
Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit in a recent concurring opinion, have
argued that this is just a way to bootstrap sexual orientation discrimination into
Title VII. 50 But several circuits have begun to embrace the argument, and the
Sixth Circuit appears to have taken it the next step and recently ruled, for the
first time by any federal circuit, that gender identity discrimination, as such,
violates Title VII, and that transsexuals, who by definition are persons whose
gender identity is discordant from their biological sex, can assert sex
51discrimination claims under Title VII using the Price Waterhouse theory.
This development was surprising as just a few weeks earlier, in an
unpublished opinion, a different panel of the Sixth Circuit had perfunctorily
rejected just such a theory in Johnson v. Fresh Mark Inc.52 Circuit Judges
Ryan, Daughtrey, and Clay found in a per curiam opinion that the trial court
had correctly applied existing precedent to rule that Title VII does not prohibit
discrimination based on an individual's status as a transsexual, citing three
prominent cases from other circuit courts that predate Price Waterhouse, and
specifically rejecting the application of Price Waterhouse to the plaintiffs
claim. 53 This case involved a male to female transsexual who was hired as a
woman but ran into problems because she used whichever restroom facility was
48 Id. at 280.
49 See, e.g., Doe v. City of Belleville, Ill., 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. granted,
judgment vacated for reconsideration, sub nom. City of Belleville v. Doe, 523 U.S. 1001
(1998).
50 Harem v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058 (7th Cir. 2003).
51 Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004).
52 Johnson v. Fresh Mark, Inc., No. 03-334, 2004, U.S. App. LEXIS 9997 (6th Cir. May 18,
2004) (per curiam).5 3 1d. at3.
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most handy, leading to complaints by co-workers.54 When management
checked her driver's license and saw the designation of male, it determined that
Ms. Johnson could use only the men's room. She refused to return to work
under such conditions and was fired for absenteeism. 5 6 She claimed violations
of the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) and Title VII.57 The trial court
correctly found that the ADA did not apply, since it includes an express
exclusion of coverage for transsexualism, and, following precedent, that Title
VII did not apply to cases of transsexual discrimination,58 a conclusion that was
affirmed by a Sixth Circuit panel.59
Just weeks later, a different Sixth Circuit panel, consisting of Circuit
Judges Cole and Gilman and Senior District Judge Schwarzer from California,
sitting by designation, ruled the other way in Smith v. City of Salem, Ohio.60
(Perhaps this shows that the Sixth Circuit really attributes no precedential
weight to its unpublished opinions.) Perhaps Judge Schwarzer was introducing
Ninth Circuit views here, because it is the Ninth Circuit that has so
enthusiastically used the Price Waterhouse stereotyping theory as a way of
expanding the meaning of sex discrimination under Title VII, in sexual
61harassment cases. In any event, Judge Cole is credited as author of
the opinion.62
Jimmie Smith, a lieutenant in the Salem Fire Department, began the
process of transitioning from male to female, and as soon as higher
management in the Fire Department found out, they tried to figure out, in
collaboration with city officials, a way to get rid of Smith.63 The court does not
say why they wanted to get rid of Smith, but one presumes they believed that
Smith's gender transition on the job would adversely affect the operation of the
fire department, or perhaps they were just uncomfortable with having a
transsexual as a firefighter.
64
54 Id. at 1.
5 Id at 2.
56 id.
17 Id. at
58 Id. at 3.
59 Id.
60 Smith, 378 F. 3d at 566.
61 See Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538
U.S. 922 (2003).
62 Smith, 378 F.3d at 567.
63 Id. at 568.
64 Id. at 569.
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In this case, a group of top city officials held a special meeting to try to
figure out a way to get rid of Smith without provoking a lawsuit.65 They
decided to require Smith to submit to a series of intrusive psychological
evaluations as a condition of continued employment, hoping Smith would
quit.66 An official who was sympathetic to Smith thought this had the flavor of
a witch-hunt, and telephoned Smith to warn about what was coming.67 Smith
retained a lawyer, who contacted the mayor to warn about potential legal
liability.61 Within a few days, on a pretext of some violation of a policy that
had not been uniformly enforced, the department immediately suspended
Smith, who filed a complaint of sex discrimination and retaliation in violation
of Title VII and the US Constitution. 69 The trial judge, ironically the same trial
judge who had ruled in the Johnson v. Fresh Mark case, granted the city's
motion to dismiss, on the ground that all precedent held that transsexuals are
not protected from discrimination under Title VII.
70
But the Sixth Circuit panel accepted a more nuanced interpretation of sex
discrimination. Transsexuals, of course, are protected from sex discrimination
under Title VII, the same as everybody else. 71 Indeed, homosexuals are also
protected under Title VII from discrimination on the basis of any of the
characteristics enumerated in that statute: race or color, sex, national origin, or
religion.72 Sex has been read by the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse to
include gender, and specifically to include discrimination against those who fail
to live up to the sex stereotypes their employers or co-workers would favor.7 3
Given such a reading, the Sixth Circuit panel found it clear that any
discrimination against Jimmie Smith for transitioning from one sex to another
had to be covered under Title VII, and that taking adverse personnel action
against such a person for retaining legal counsel and complaining about
potential discrimination constituted forbidden retaliation under the statute.74
Additionally, as Smith was a public employee, the court had to consider
whether the actions taken against him might also be prohibited under the
65 Id.
66 id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 id.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 570.
721 d. at 571.
71 Id. at 573.74 Id. at 577.
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Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. 75 This was a case of direct
discrimination on the basis of Smith's gender non-conformity, and the court
found that it fell within the theory of "disparate treatment" sex discrimination,
which would be subjected to heightened scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause.
7 6
One presumes the City of Salem will try to appeal these rulings if it decides
not to settle immediately with Ms. Smith, but for now this is the precedent in
the Sixth Circuit. The prior Johnson case, as an unpublished opinion, does not
have the same authority.7 7 Consequently, both public and private sector
employers within the geographical jurisdiction of the Sixth Circuit are subject
to an enforceable requirement not to discriminate in employment on the basis of
gender identity.
78
In the Sixth Circuit, transgendered employees may now enjoy more
protection against discrimination in the workplace than lesbian or gay
employees. The later cannot always make the same sort of sexual stereotyping
arguments that transgender employees can make, and their protection against
discrimination relies on a less powerful view of the Equal Protection Clause,
inasmuch as the lower federal courts have usually construed Romer as not
having established sexual orientation as a suspect classification, and state,
county or municipal civil rights ordinances, which are not universally
available.79 A gay or lesbian employee who encounters workplace adversity
because of their sexual orientation, as such, has no recourse under Title VII, but
a transgendered employee automatically would have recourse, under this
ruling.8°
Although the Sixth Circuit might be seen as venturing into uncharted
territory with this ruling, there is a foundation of prior cases to build upon.81 In
addition to Price Waterhouse itself (which did not involve a transsexual or a
lesbian, just a woman who presented a somewhat "macho" workplace
personality style), in 2000 the Ninth Circuit found that the Violence Against
Women Act could be invoked by a transsexual crime victim,82 and the First
71 Id. at 576-577.
76 Id. at 577.
77 See supra note 52.
78 See supra note 2.
79 See supra note 15
80 See supra note 2.
81 Infra notes 83-84.
82 Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000).
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Circuit found that a cross-dressing male who was denied service could bring a
sex discrimination claim against a bank under the federal statute banning sex
discrimination in credit transactions.83 The court could also draw from the
growing body of hostile environment cases where men who were either gay or
were perceived by co-workers as being gay were allowed to make their sex
discrimination claims based on the sex stereotyping theory.84
From the early 1970s until 1996, gay rights advocates tried without success
to get Congress to amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to add sexual
orientation, 85 and since 1995 a proposed Employment Non-Discrimination Act
(ENDA) has been introduced in each session to accomplish a more narrowly
targeted ban on some forms of sexual orientation discrimination.86 The
legislative sponsors of these bills have resisted broadening it to include gender
identity, to the consternation of transgender rights groups, but these groups may
now have the last laugh; if the Sixth Circuit's bold move holds up, they will not
need the gay rights movement to achieve their aim of statutory protection, while
ENDA remains mired in committee, having never even achieved a committee
vote in the House of Representatives in the ten years that it has been pending.
III. SPECIFIC WORKPLACE ISSUES
There is continuing litigation over religious opposition to the employment
of sexual minorities.87 One such case litigated in Kentucky is Pedreira v.
Kentucky Baptist Homes for Children, Inc.88 The defendant, a Baptist-affiliated
social services agency that received extensive state funding, discharged in
1988, solely on religious grounds, a staff member who was discovered to be
lesbian, before the enactment of Louisville's ordinance banning sexual
orientation discrimination. 89 The employee, Alice Pedreira, sued under Title
VII, claiming that she had been discriminated against on the basis of religion;
that is, that her failure to conform her lifestyle to Baptist tenets opposing
homosexuality was the cause of her termination.90 Chief Judge Simpson of the
83 Rosa v. Park West Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213 (1st Cir. 2000).
84 Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S.Ct.
1573 (2003).85 See H.R. 166, 94th Cong. (1975), H.R. 1454, 97th Cong. (1982).
86 Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1995, H.R. 3285, 104th Cong. (1995).
87 See infra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
88 Pedreira v. Ky. Baptist Homes for Children, 186 F. Supp. 2d 757 (W.D. Ky. 2001).
89 Id.at 759.
9 Id.
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U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky in Louisville rejected
her argument, finding that she was discharged due to her lesbian lifestyle, not
due to her religious beliefs.9' However, in the same opinion, Judge Simpson
accepted, at least preliminarily, the argument that Kentucky Baptist Homes' use
of federal and state money for religious proselytizing among the children who
received its services might violate the Establishment Clause of the Constitution,
and there has been ongoing controversy since the decision about government
funding for the institution.
92
This case takes on particular significance in light of the Bush
Administration's announced policy of extending eligibility for federal financial
assistance to a wide array of faith-based organizations, some of which maintain
personnel policies that discriminate against sexual minorities. Lambda Legal, a
national gay rights litigation group, brought a similar complaint against a faith-
based social services organization in Georgia on grounds of sexual orientation
discrimination by a recipient of public funding, a case that was so strengthened
by Lawrence v. Texas that a settlement was achieved a few months after that
decision was issued.93
Another issue arises from a new legislative phenomenon in a few major
cities, the enactment of local ordinances that condition the awarding of city
contracts on the extension of employee benefits eligibility to the same-sex
domestic partners of gay employees. 94 San Francisco was the first to enact such
a requirement, soon followed by some other west coast cities.95 Portland,
Maine, enacted a requirement that contractors receiving certain public housing
funds provide such benefits.96 Domestic partnership benefits have come to be
a major issue in many workplaces. According to recent reports, a substantial
minority of Fortune 500 corporations has voluntarily extended such benefits to
their employees,97 and many localities and a few states have extended the
91 Id. at 760.
92 Id. at 763.
93 Bellmore v. United Methodist Children's Home and Dep't. of Human Resources of Ga.,
Complaint submitted July 31, 2002; settled November 11, 2003.
94 See infra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
95 SAN FRANCISCO ADMIN. CODE § 12B. 1 (d) (1997); SEATrTLE WA. MUN. CODE § 20.45.020
(2000); Los ANGELES MUNICIPAL CODE, EQUAL BENEFITS ORDINANCE, § 10.8.2.1 (Revision 8,
2004).
96 PORTLAND MUNICIPAL CODE, Ch. 13.6, 6-21 (2002).
97 According to the Human Rights Campaign Foundation, which systematically collects
data that can be accessed on its website, www.hrc.org, the following numbers had been reached
as of September 6, 2004: 217 of the Fortune 500 companies offered domestic partnership
benefits to same-sex partners of their employees, 211 colleges and universities did so, as did 132
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benefits either through legislation or collective bargaining. 98  In Hawaii,
Vermont, and California, statutes provide that state employees who register
their non-marital domestic partnerships with their employers are entitled to
receive spousal benefits. 99 Such large cities as New York, Atlanta, and
Philadelphia have also legislated such benefits. '0 Many large universities and
other non-profit organizations almost routinely provide them now.
The question whether there is any legal obligation for an employer to
provide such benefits in the absence of direct legislative requirements arises
under two possible theories: that the failure of a public employer to do so
violates equal protection requirements; and that the failure of a private sector
employer to do so may require the employer to forego lucrative contracts to
provide goods or services to one of the municipalities that requires it. States
and localities cannot directly require private sector employers to provide these
benefits, due to the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act, ERISA, a
federal statute that preempts states and localities from passing laws affecting
employee benefit plans. 01 The question whether states or localities can
premise public contracts on the provision of such benefits is an issue that has
been litigated, albeit in specialized contexts. 0 2 San Francisco's Equal Benefits
Law has partially survived court challenge on this ground, 0 3 the courts have
municipal and county governments and ten state governments. As of this date, HRC had
counted 7,057 private sector employers that had adopted domestic partnership benefits plans.
98 In New York City, for example, Mayor David Dinkins responded to an adverse
interlocutory ruling in a benefits suit by the Gay Teachers Association by concluding an
agreement on domestic partnership benefits with unions representing city workers, the result
later being codified in an ordinance during the administration of Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, Local
Law 27 of 1998, codified at N.Y. Code Tit. 3, Ch. 2, Subch. 3.
99 The Hawaii Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act, 1997 HAw. SEss. LAws § 4,383; The Vermont
Civil Union Law, VT. SEss. LAWS HB 847, Act 91 § 3 (codified as 15 VT. STAT. ANN. § 1204)
(1999); The California Registered Domestic Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act, AB 205,
CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (Deering 2003).
10o For N.Y.C., see supra note 98.
101 The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1974)
(preemption provision).
10 2 See infra notes 104-108 and accompanying text.
103 See Air Transp. Ass'n of America v. City and County of San Francisco, 992 F. Supp.
1149 (N.D. Cal. 1998), affd but remanded in part, 266 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2001). This
litigation raised special issues under the Air Line Transportation Act as well as the ERISA
preemption issues mentioned above. The court upheld San Francisco's requirements inasmuch
as the city was acting as a consumer of goods or services as opposed to a regulator of private
sector conduct, but only with respect to a contractor's activities that related to work on contracts
for San Francisco. The opinions are complex and reach certain conclusions due to the
specialized interaction of federal regulation of airline operations, which were involved because
the plaintiffs' coverage under the city ordinance was related to contracts involving operations at
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rejected the argument that subsequent enactment by the state of a Domestic
Partnership law has preempted the ability of localities to legislate on this
subject,1°4 and reportedly more than 3,000 private sector employers have
adopted domestic partnership benefits programs in order to continue trading
with San Francisco.1°5 Portland's ordinance was also sustained, at least in
part. 106 However, the question of ERISA preemption has not been definitely
resolved. In the meantime, New York's city council passed a similar bill,
which was vetoed by Mayor Mike Bloomberg, whose veto was subsequently
overridden by the council.10 7 Litigation will likely commence to test whether
the ordinance was within the council's legislative power.
The recent arrival of legal same-sex marriages in Massachusetts,' °8 civil
unions in Vermont,' °9 registered domestic partnerships in California, 0 and
reciprocal beneficiaries in Hawaii,"' as well as same-sex marriages in foreign
countries, 11 2 raise additional issues for employers. Setting aside the legal
question whether an employer in Kentucky would have any obligation to
recognize such a marriage for purposes of workplace benefits and privileges,
there is the question whether it makes good personnel policy to do so. The
legal obligation for a private sector employer to give extraterritorial effect to
such marriages is probably nil at this point, but the policy reasons for doing so
the municipal airport. In a companion case, S.D. Myers, Inc. v. City and County of San
Francisco, 253 F.3d 461 (9th Cir. 2001), the court rejected various other challenges to the
ordinance, and held that the plaintiff, a disappointed city contract bidder based in Ohio, lacked
standing to raise the ERISA preemption issue.
104 S.D. Myers, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco, 336 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 2003).
105 This number is based on anecdotal reports from the gay press.
106 Catholic Charities of Me., Inc. v. City of Portland, 304 F. Supp. 2d 77 (D. Me. 2004).
107 N.Y.C. ADMiN. CODE, Title 6, § 6-126 (2004).
108 Pursuant to the ruling by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Goodridge v.
Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003), same-sex couples began to marry in that
state on May 17, 2004.
109 An Act Relating to Civil Unions, VT. STAT. ANN. Tit. 15, § 1204(a) (Supp. 2001).
110 California Domestic Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act, A.B. 206, Ch. 421,
codified in CAL. FAMILY CODE, Div. 2.5 - Domestic Partners Registration (2003).
1 HAW. SEss. LAWS 1997, § 383.
112 As of the summer of 2004, citizens or legal residents of the Netherlands and Belgium
could contract lawful same-sex marriages, including with non-citizens or non-residents of those
countries. Beginning in the summer of 2003, pursuant to court decisions construing Canada's
Charter of Rights and Freedoms to require a modification of the common law definition of
marriage in Canada to become gender-neutral, same-sex partners could marry in several
provinces in Canada, and because there was no residency requirement, an indeterminate number
of same-sex couples from the United States have gone to such popular tourist destination cities
as Vancouver, Toronto, Montreal, and Quebec to marry. The leading Canadian case is Halpern
v. Toronto (City) Clerk, 2003 CarswellOnt 2159 (O.A.C. 2003).
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may be substantial, the same concerns for competitiveness and employee
morale that have driven so many corporations to adopt domestic partnership
initiatives in response to competitive pressures, the lobbying of internal
employee groups, or the bargaining demands of labor unions. For public sector
employers, the issue may be more complicated, because principles of comity
have routinely been applied by courts to require governments to recognize
marriages that were lawful where they were performed, but comity allows for
public policy reservations, and in a state that has adopted a statute expressly
stating a public policy against recognizing same-sex marriages, the practice of
comity would probably not be strong enough to require such recognition."'
Finally, one of the most significant issues for transgender employees is the
ability to use restroom facilities in the workplace. There are not many
published decisions involving transgender workplace discrimination claims, but
some of the few published decisions revolve around this issue. 1 4 The
transgendered employee who is in the process of transitioning will most likely
desire to use the restroom facilities provided for their desired gender. That
means a male to female transgendered person will want to use the women's
facilities. The transition process has many stages, and not all male to female
transgenders want to take the final plastic surgery steps or can afford to do so.
Nonetheless, due to hormone therapy and castration of their body shape, voice
and appearance may have become significantly feminized, and their gender
identity would make it difficult or inappropriate to use the men's room. On the
other hand, female employees may object to having people they do not fully
accept as women using the women's restroom. The solution that may work best
is some modest renovation into unisex restroom facilities, although this would
be more difficult in employee locker room situations.
The immediate legal question is whether the employer is obligated to
accommodate a transgendered employee by providing acceptable restroom
facilities, and what that would consist of. This question takes on new
113 So far, only one reported court decision has discussed the comity question, with respect
to a same-sex marriage from Canada, and it deals with federal rather than state comity practices.
On Aug. 17, 2004, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Tacoma, Washington, ruling in In re Lee
Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, noted both the federal and state laws banning recognition of same-sex
marriages and held that comity did not require recognition the marriage for purposes of a federal
bankruptcy filing.
114 Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982); Sommers v. Iowa Civil
Rights Comm'n, 337 N.W.2d 470 (Iowa 1983). ARTHUR S. LEONARD, Sexuality and the Law:
An Encyclopedia of Major Legal Cases, 422-425 (Garland Pub.) (1993) (the saga of Audra
Sommers' unsuccessful attempt to vindicate her discrimination claims is recounted).
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immediacy with the recent Sixth Circuit decision finding that discrimination
against transgendered employees violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.1 15 There is a decision from Minnesota, one of the handful of states with a
statutory prohibition on discrimination based on gender identity.' 16 In Goins v.
West Group,' 7 the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that so long as the
employer provided some restroom facility that the transgendered employee
could use, the statute was not violated by the fact that the facility in question
was less desirable or convenient than the restrooms provided to other workers,
or by the exclusion of the employee from the restroom that she preferred
consistent with her gender identity when other employees objected.' 8 This
ruling reversed a decision by the state's court of appeals, which held that the
employer had discriminated in a case where the employee encountered
unacceptable inconvenience in using the only restroom made available to her. 119
Obviously, the best way to avoid litigation over this issue is to respond
sensitively to the restroom needs of transgendered employees, which requires
some empathetic consideration from the employer and perhaps the expenditure
of some money. However, at this point the limits of legal obligation in this
regard are not well established.
IV. CONCLUSION
Over the past half century there has been a radical change regarding the
legal rights of sexual minorities in the workplace. In both the public and
private sectors, many, perhaps most-employees now work for employers who
are legally bound not to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, and
employers now subject to Title VII are also subject to the ban on gender
identity discrimination. These obligations are becoming most firmly
established in the area of workplace harassment, where federal courts are
increasingly seeing Title VII's ban on sex discrimination as imposing
obligations on employers to deal with workplace harassment of sexual
minorities. Clearly, employers that operate in jurisdictions that specifically
protect sexual minority workers have to become cognizant of these issues, and
any large employer with operations in many states is likely to be operating in at
115 See supra note 2.
116 See infra note 117.
117 Goins v. Westgroup, 635 N.W.2d 717 (Minn. 2001), rev'g 619 N.W.2d 424 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2000).
8 Id. at 721.
1"9 Id. at 720.
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least some jurisdictions with pertinent legislation. This is a field where the
legal rules are in significant flux; so vigilance by Human Resources
professionals is definitely necessary to ensure that employers are in compliance
with current law. Furthermore, as a matter of good personnel practice,
employers may want to consider outpacing the legal requirements and, as many
employers have done, voluntarily adopt non-discrimination policies and
practices that take into account the workplace participation of sexual minorities.
